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 Coty runs a selective distribution system (SDS) for cosmetics/perfumes and applies criteria to 
support its luxury image
 Under amended rules:
 online sales from authorised retailer’s own online store permitted provided luxury
character of products preserved
 authorised retailers must sell online under their own name and may not engage an 
unauthorised third party in a manner discernible to the public  
 Parfümerie Akzentze refuses to sign up to amended rules; sells through Amazon; Coty sues 
 First instance court finds against Coty on platform restriction, citing Pierre Fabre. OLG 
Frankfurt refers questions on SDS and platform restriction to the ECJ
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Coty - First issue: what types of product justify SDS?
 Under established case law, SDS justified where: 
 Needed to preserve the quality or ensure proper use of a product (Metro)
 Promotes non-price competition : e.g., between outlets providing specialist services for 
high quality and high technology products (AEG)
 Prevents damage to the prestigious image of luxury products, which for consumers is
part of their quality, that may result from sales in inappropriate selling environments
(Leclerc; trade mark law: Copad)
 Pierre Fabre: 
 «the aim of maintaining a prestigious image is not a legitimate aim for restricting
competition ».  Did this overturn previous case law for luxury products?
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 Nature of luxury products justifies use of SDS under Article 101(1) TFEU to preserve their 
luxury image
 Court affirms pre-Pierre Fabre type of justification specific to luxury products
 Quality of luxury goods includes their allure and prestigious image; sales in 
inappropriate types of stores may damage this allure/image and thereby their quality 
 Court distinguishes Pierre Fabre (protecting prestige not legitimate aim for restricting 
competition): different context of absolute internet sales prohibition; and non-luxury 




Coty - Second issue: platform restriction
 No prior EU guidance/case law on application of Article 101
 Commission considers platform ban to be block exempted
 Vertical Guidelines, para. 54
 E-Commerce sector inquiry report – platforms not key as 90% of surveyed retailers sell
through own stores 
 Conflicting case law at national level, within Germany
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Coty platform restriction: Art 101
 Prohibition on selling Coty goods on third party platforms (3PP) in a manner discernible to consumers where 
it is intended to ensure the luxury image of those goods is compatible with Article 101(1)
 The restriction must meet the Metro criteria : it must be (objectively) qualitative, uniform, non-
discriminatory and proportionate
 As the objective of protecting the luxury image was legitimate, the focus was on whether the 
platform ban was proportionate. It is proportionate because:
→ It is appropriate in order to ensure that:
 Coty goods are associated exclusively with authorised distributors (the essence of SDS);
 all online sales of Coty goods meet qualitative requirements (Coty has no rights against 
platform; imposing quality criteria on 3PPs through authorised retailers not as effective);
 Coty goods are not sold where all kinds of goods are sold (risks undermining luxury)
→ It does not go beyond what is necessary (limited effects on online sales):
 Not absolute prohibition on online sales (or even on undiscernible platform sales);
 E-commerce report> most distributors sell through own online shops
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Coty platform restriction: VABER
 Prohibition on selling Coty goods on 3PPs in this manner is, in any event, exempted by the 
Vertical Agreements Block Exemption (VABER)
 Only relevant where 3PP ban restricts competition under Art. 101
 Not a ban on online sales (distinguishes Pierre Fabre)
 Not a customer restriction and does not restrict passive sales to end users :
→ No identifiable group of 3PP customers to whom sales restricted
→ Distributors can advertise online, e.g., via online third-party platforms and search 
engines, enabling consumers to find retailers’ own stores
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Take aways from Coty
VABER: platform restriction
 Platform restrictions (in any system) benefit from the VABER. No indication this is limited to 
luxury products (based on limited effect, not objective justification )
 It cannot be assumed the same conclusion necessarily applies to internet advertising 
restrictions (absence of such restrictions emphasised by ECJ)
 Vertical Guidelines require equivalence of on- and off-line restrictions. Is this right if retailer can 
nonetheless effectively sell online? 
Article 101(1): platform restriction
 Position clear for luxury products in SDS: no infringement
 Position not resolved for other products in SDS, but a key issue will be whether the product 
justifies the use of SDS
→ If it does not, question probably moot  
→ If it does, the Coty reasoning may well apply by analogy (no association with 
unauthorised retailers; no direct contractual rights of supplier to enforce criteria)




Take aways from Coty (2)
Article 101(1): SDS
 As VABER applies broadly to SDS, how often is a 101(1) analysis key?  
 Nothing has changed for luxury products (whatever they may be): nature of product
justifies use of SDS under 101(1)
 Ruling not relevant for other products
 Original case law refers to quality not luxury
 SDS should be a legitimate means to protect a reputation for quality more generally, 
and not only a reputation for luxury




 Asics’ Distribution System 1.0
 Includes Internet specific restraints, such as no price comparison sites (PCS), no use of 
Asics brand name in search engines and for advertising on third party platforms
 German Bundeskartellamt: Distribution System violates Article 101 TFEU because of PCS, 
search engine & advertising prohibition (2015)
 PCS ban and search engine/advertising ban are object restrictions under Article 101(1)
 Hard core restraints under Article 4(c) VABER
 Not objectively justified, no efficiency justification
 Critical of other restraints, but not included in Decision
 OLG Düsseldorf affirms (2017)
 PCS bans are restriction by object (freedom of distributors, price competition) under 
Article 101(1) as they are not justified in light of the nature of the products – Pierre 
Fabre
 No luxury or complex products, PCSs not detrimental to image of brand
 Hard core restraint under VABER: passive sales restriction à la Pierre Fabre (irrelevant 
that only partial ban and not total ban of internet sales)
 No leave to appeal (no open legal questions to be clarified)
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 Challenge of denial of leave to appeal
 Limited to appeal court finding that VABER does not apply to PCS ban
 No challenge of Article 101(1) TFEU infringement finding
 Narrow scope of review
 Supreme Court rejects appeal – no need to clarify whether PCS ban is blacklisted under 
Article 4(c) VABER
 No doubt about correct answer, no different views (including in Commission’s e-
commerce Report)
 At least total PCS ban (not qualitative criteria applicable to PCSs) is hardcore
 Substantial restraint of online retailers’ ability to reach potential customers 
 No questions under EU law in light of Coty
 Coty concerned luxury products, not “regular” branded products
 Asics restraints went beyond Coty restraints (e.g., prohibition of use of Asics trademark 
on third-party sites)
 In practice, no longer guaranteed that customers have access to internet offering to a 
substantial extent
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Asics - Questions
 Luxury products v. branded products  - meaningful difference?
 Stricter approach to PCSs than to 3PPs under Article 101(1) TFEU?
 Would PCS restraints based on qualitative criteria be treated differently?
 Under VABER, how can PCSs ban restrict effective internet selling (and be considered hard-
core), when 3PP ban does not?
 Would “pure” PCS ban, without search engine/advertising restraint be permissible 
under VABER?
 Can additional restraints imposed by Asics be relevant under VABER evaluation?




 Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping), Commission Decision of 27/06/2017
 Not about restrictions imposed in distribution systems, but about alleged effect of Google’s 
unilateral conduct in general search service market on its competitors in shopping comparison 
services market
 Key point for Coty/Asics: Commission market analysis
 Ultimate “victims” of restrictions imposed by Coty and Asics do not compete in same market
 Fundamental distinction between shopping comparison services and merchant platforms 
(Amazon, Fnac, etc. do not compete with Google Shopping)
 Unlike comparison websites, the activities of merchant platforms closely resemble those of retailers, 
even if the platform is not legally the seller
 The platform acts as a place where retailers and consumers can conclude sales
 Platforms are perceived by both users and comparison shopping services as ‘final destination’ 
multi-brand retailers
 Platforms typically offer after-sales support
 Unlike PCSs, merchant platforms do not attract traffic to the merchant’s own website by including 
its prices in a general comparison function




Link to Coty and Asics findings?
 Could be said to be consistent with the different outcomes in Coty and Asics
 It is legitimate to prevent sales over platforms as they are in effect unauthorised 
retailers – it is the basic premise of SDS that the supplier should be able to decide who is 
part of distribution system. 
 Justification for preventing authorised retailers from using comparison websites may be 
seen as less obvious as any sale following use of a PCS takes place in the authorised 
retailer’s own webstore
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